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LANGUAGE AND MEMORY IN BORGES’ 
“FUNES, THE MEMORIOUS”
Elyce Rae Helford
IN “FUN ES, T h e  Memorious,” Borges embarks upon an examination 
of the nature of communication. Ireneo Funes, the object of this 
fictional testimonial, is thrown from a horse to find himself physically 
crippled, yet, as he sees it, mentally enlightened. He finds he has 
become capable of complete and perfect recall. He can reconstruct his 
most distant memory, intuit the number of stars in the sky, or recite 
entire books he has read, all with equal ease:
On falling from the horse, he lost consciousness; when he recovered it, the present 
was almost intolerable it was so rich and bright; the same was true of the most 
ancient and most trivial memories. A little later he realized that he was crippled. 
This fact scarcely interested him. He reasoned (or felt) that immobility was a 
minimum price to pay. And now, his perception and his memory were infallible.1
However, for this enlightenment, Funes has simultaneously forfeited 
the elements essential for the creation of original thought: omission 
and abstraction. The narrator reflects:
Without effort, he had learned English, French, Portuguese, Latin. I suspect, 
nevertheless, that he was not very capable of thought. To think is to forget a 
difference, to generalize, to abstract. In the overly replete world of Funes there 
were nothing but details, almost contiguous details.2
For Funes to communicate his experience to a listener, the use of 
language is necessary. Funes must access a common code between 
himself and the narrator of the story and manipulate it in the manner 
which expresses his thoughts most clearly. Manipulation of language, 
however, requires a distillation process which would be highly prob­
lematic in Funes’ complex and alien world of recall. To explain this 
difficulty more concretely, it is beneficial to have a model from which 
to work.
Ferdinand de Saussure developed a system of language based on
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the relationships between words. He wrote, “Language is a system of 
interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely 
from the presence of others.”3 According to Saussure, these relation­
ships can be most clearly understood as the functions of two perpen­
dicular axes. He terms these axes the syntagmatic (or “horizontal”) 
and the associative (or “vertical”).
Syntagmatic relationships are those of sequential movement 
through time. Each word derives meaning from those which precede 
and follow it. Terence Hawkes terms this process the “pattern of 
positioning.”4 The associative axis is based on specific word selection 
at each syntagmatic “moment” of communication. When one wishes 
to say or write something, each word must be chosen through a 
process of elimination. Of Saussure’s conception of the associative 
function, Hawkes writes:
. . . each word will also have relationships with other words in the language which 
do not occur at this point in time, but are capable of doing so. . . . And these other 
words . . . help, by not being chosen, to define the meaning of the word which 
has. It obviously follows from our notion of language as a self-contained structure 
that the absence of certain words partly creates and certainly winnows and refines 
the meanings of those that are present. . . .5
According to this model, then, a person continually selects one word 
in favor of another in order to express his or her thoughts in the 
clearest possible manner. In everyday speech these selections are 
made almost without thought, for as each word is selected for a given 
utterance, the “list” from which the next may be chosen becomes 
smaller, due to such constraints as context and grammar; therefore, 
once an idea has begun to be expressed, continuing and completing 
the thought happens almost automatically. This observation, I feel, is 
crucial to understanding Funes’ world and the nature of language for 
Borges.
Because Funes’ altered state of mind causes him to remember and 
weigh all thoughts, words, and events equally, it seems nearly incon­
ceivable that he is able to make the decisions and selections required 
for communication. Even if he is granted the retention of every-day 
“mindless” speech, he must still order and place relative value on each 
general thought he wishes to express. If he opts to describe the 
moment he fell from his horse, for instance, he would be simulta­
neously and equally forcefully compelled to reveal the sensation of the 
fall, his immediate physical and emotional response to the fall, the 
reason for the fall, the horse’s reaction to the fall, the reactions of 
anyone nearby to the fall, the appearance of the sky at the moment of 
the fall, ad infinitim. For each thought, if not each individual word, 
movement along the syntagmatic axis would necessarily cause great 
ambivalence due to the selective demands of the associative axis.
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Yet Funes does speak. Borges forces his readers to accept the 
paradox of this m an’s “enlightened” existence by making it theoreti­
cally improbable (if not impossible) for Funes to communicate his 
message while revealing, albeit through indirect discourse, that he 
does. Clearly, Funes must be allowed to speak, for the text demands 
that he relate his story. However, for Borges it is equally important 
that Funes speak precisely because he should not be able to. The 
paradox is intentional and thought-provoking.
In a parenthetical note, John Sturrock muses over this puzzle from 
another vantage point:
. . .  it is not quite clear from the story how Funes could ever manage to tell his 
story, as he does, to the narrator during the night they spend together; the narrator 
is careful to tell us that the story we are reading is his no doubt defective account 
of what he heard from Funes, but the fact that Funes was able to say anything at 
all about himself indicates an unsuspected gift for abstraction.6
Sturrock is concerned less with Funes’ ability to speak than with his 
ability to speak of “self,” a concept which requires reflective and 
abstract thought. Yet, if one considers the manipulation of language 
to be inherently personal, then Sturrock’s point can lead to a more 
general understanding. The work of Freud helps clarify this.
Jacques Derrida, in his reading of Freud, proposes a theory which 
unites subject/self with subject/topic of communication. Elizabeth 
Wright provides an excellent summary of this reading:
In Derrida’s reading of Freud . . . the unconscious, through memories non­
verbal as well as verbal . . . becomes active in the production of meaning, its 
traces being present in every word . . . for Derrida the unconscious is a weave of 
pure traces . . . [it] is operative in language all the time (seeing text as psyche).7
According to this theory, then, communication itself is impossible 
without a personal bias, however unconscious this bias may often be. 
Although Funes can not articulate or even acknowledge a “self’ (for 
this requires abstract thought) his communication is still affected by it.
The nature of communication is also examined through the mind 
of the narrator. The narrator is quick to remind his audience that his 
memory, unlike Funes’, is fallable. He can only replicate his dialogue 
with Funes as accurately as he can remember it, selecting his words 
not for their literal accuracy, but for their ability to convey the sense 
of what he feels was said.
I shall not attempt to reproduce his words, now irrecoverable. I prefer truthfully to 
make a resum£ of the many things Ireneo told me. The indirect style is remote and 
weak; I know that I sacrifice the effectiveness of my narrative; but let my readers 
imagine the nebulous sentences which clouded that night.8 
It is noteworthy that Borges chooses the word resume for the 
format of the narrator’s description. A resum£ can be a recitation of 
facts, yet the word can also mean an approximation or summary. This
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recalls the narrator’s ability to abstract and generalize, while also 
emphasizing the inexactness of common recall.
Of the two men, Funes clearly experiences the greater disability. 
This is revealed by his failed attempt at redesigning the system of 
enumeration. Even when Funes succeeds in selecting his new, more 
concise numerical terms (such as Maximo Perez instead of seven 
thousand thirteen), he still can not understand the workings of the 
system. Sturrock writes:
It is a sequence when it ought to have been a series, and if the original values of 
Funes’ terms were lost they might be arranged in any order at all, they are 
meaningful only for as long as they can be translated back into the system they have 
replaced.9
Funes’ new “numbers” form a sequence whose elements derive 
meaning only when mapped onto the present numerical system, 
which is a series. In a sequence, the only relative requirement between 
elements is spatial; whereas in a series, each term must have some 
explicit relationship to others which enables some form of internal 
calculation, predictions, and the generation of new elements. This is 
perhaps made most clear by the definition of a mathematical series in 
Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary: “an infinite number of terms 
following one another, each of which is derived from one or more of 
the preceding ones, by a fixed law. . . Funes’ numbers follow no 
explicit laws, so they fail as a series.
If the reader has not made the discovery that Funes succeeded in 
producing a mere sequence, the narrator of the story states this 
directly:
I attempted to explain that this rhapsody of unconnected terms was precisely the 
contrary of a system of enumeration. I said that to say three hundred and sixty-five 
was to say three hundreds, six tens, five units: an analysis which does not exist in 
such numbers as The Negro Timoteo or The Flesh Blanket. Funes did not 
understand me, or did not wish to understand me.10
Funes clearly fails in his attempt because he is incapable of seeing 
the system as such in order to understand its overall construction and 
significance. Substituting elements without comprehension, or even 
acknowledgment of the principles used to create the system will rarely 
produce a useful new system (any exceptions would probably occur by 
chance).
From its very title, “Funes, the Memorious” is a story about the 
function of memory. Despite the fact that I have chosen to examine 
the story in terms of communication and language, memory plays an 
important role in such an analysis. Richard J. Christ discusses the 
theme of memory as dominant in the fiction of Borges:
Borges likes to write stories about events filtered through individual or collective 
memory because in his view the perspective of memory serves to diminish the
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extraneous and emphasize the essential.11
This brief comment helps to explain a great deal about Borges’ 
careful and frequently fascinating attention to point of view in his 
fiction, as well as his attention to other closely related stylistic details. 
Yet in “Funes, the Memorious,” “perspective of memory” is absent. In 
order to convey the workings of the memory as he understands it, 
Borges portrays an individual whose memory functions in a precisely 
inverse fashion; Funes’ memory is not exclusive, but inclusive.
Explicitly, Borges refers to his piece only as “a long metaphor of 
insomnia,” recalling the narrator’s words:
It was difficult for him to sleep. To sleep is to be abstracted from the world: Funes,
on his back in his cot, in the shadows, imagined every crevice and every moulding
of the various houses which surrounded him.12
And Borges’ words seem to me to suffice as a statement on the 
infinite memory of Funes, for it is rare, and arguably even a mistake 
for authors to speak extensively of their own works. The potential is 
too great that external interpretations will be suppressed.
Christ, on the other hand (or perhaps the same hand), refers to the 
story as illustrative of the “tragic absurdity of absolute memory.”13 
Absolutes are rare in life, and thus highly arresting and effective when 
used in literature. Aside from Christ’s use of the term “absolute” in 
reference to Funes’ memory, he also alludes to “collective memory,” 
and Borges himself bestows the epithet “the Memorious” upon his 
protagonist. Such evidence helps to advance the popular critical 
assertion that Funes is an archetypal figure.
Sturrock writes, “The ultimate paradox of Funes . . .is that he is 
himself an abstraction: he is the archetype of Memory.”14 According 
to this critic’s conception, Funes must be seen as both man and myth. 
This causes another paradox, because a mythic figure is an abstrac­
tion, and this makes Funes exactly that which he is incapable of 
comprehending.
Carl Jung’s theory of archetypes relies heavily on the concept of 
memory. He partially defines archetypes as “the inherited possibilities 
of hum an imagination as it was from time immemorial.”15 Obviously, 
the word imagination is problematic in relation to Funes, but this 
definition seems to reflect Funes’ method of recall well. In a sense, 
Funes might be termed an archetype of archetypes. Yet this assertion 
is limited by the fact that Funes’ memory does not extend further than 
his own experiences. His memory may be collective within the frame 
of his own life, but it is not culturally collective.
Earlier in this discussion, I briefly examined the conception that all 
communication reflects some level of internal vision, that non-“self- 
reflected” speech is impossible given Freud’s understanding of the
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unconscious mind. Jung, however, deconstructs this argument 
through the concept of the “collective unconscious.” Wright again 
provides a helpful summary:
These primordial images, issuing from a “collective unconscious,” collective 
“because it is detached from anything personal and is common to all” . . . manif­
est themselves in bizarre and extravagant fantasies which threaten to dissolve the 
boundaries between self and world.16
Freud considers the unconscious a signifier of self in all communi­
cation whereas Jung  considers the memories of the collective uncon­
scious an impersonal and ultimately more powerful force. In other 
words, Freud holds that the world is reflected through patterns in the 
self, while Jung holds that the self is reflected through patterns in the 
world. Such a conception of the self is perhaps more easily applied to 
Funes.
In this study, I have primarily concentrated on the inabilities and 
weaknesses of all-inclusive memory. Yet Funes considers himself 
blessed, and this must be taken into account. The narrator’s intention 
in writing down his memories of Funes is to provide a testimonial. 
Furthermore, the narrator chooses to include a curious epithet written 
by another of Funes’ acquaintances. Pedro Leandro Ipulche is said to 
have written that “Funes was a precursor of superman, ‘an untamed 
and vernacular Zarathustra.’ Analysis of this epithet yields an 
additional, yet somewhat contradictory interpretation of the nature of 
Funes. “Untamed” well defines Funes’ transformed state. He can not 
completely control his power; it eventually destroys him. “Vernacular” 
seems to be a general reference to the “certain incurable limitations” 
of his heritage and environment. And “Zarathustra” (or Zoroaster), 
the founder of the pagan religion Zoroastrianism, denotes an inspired 
and inspirational teacher of spiritual matters, calling Nietzsche to 
mind. For Ipulche, then, Funes represents an uncontrolled, inspiring 
force which operates through a common man.
This may well denote Funes; however, I would posit it as an 
excellent epithet for Borges himself. Through his fiction emerges a 
voice beyond the elements which make up this man. He seems to 
address this internal “force” in the short prose piece “Borges and I”:
It’s the other man, to Borges, that things happen. . . .  It would be an exaggeration 
to say that we are on bad terms; I live, I let myself live, so that Borges can weave 
his tales and poems, and those tales and poems are my justification. It is not hard 
for me to admit that he has managed to write a few worthwhile pages. . . . Years 
ago, I tried ridding myself of him and went from myths of the outlying slums of the 
city to games with time and infinity, but those games are now part of Borges and
I will have to turn to other things. . . .
Which of us is writing this page I don’t know.18
Ultimately, the reader of this essay may be left as steeped in paradox
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as s/he was when reading the story which it examines. A feeling of 
inconclusiveness occurs primarily because any interpretation of the 
story remains necessarily incomplete. Examination of the figure of 
Funes resists closure just as Funes’ memory does. For every probable 
angle of interpretation, Borges has encouraged additional and often 
opposing angles: Funes should not be able to communicate, yet he 
does; he lives as a man, yet functions as an archetype; he is both tragic 
victim and superman; etc. It is only possible, then, to accept attempts 
to understand Funes as partial truths: valuable in themselves, yet 
never final.
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